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Abstract—The VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) data link, responsi-
ble for transmitting Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS)
corrections from the GBAS ground station to the aircraft, is one
major bottleneck for the evolution and security of GBAS. It
provides limited bandwidth, range, only line-of-sight capabilities
and no cyber-security protections for the transmitted data. Hence
the use of an alternative data link for GBAS, overcoming these
constraints, is desirable. The L-band Digital Aeronautical Com-
munications System (LDACS) has been demonstrated to over-
come aforementioned issues. The first demonstration of secure
GBAS over LDACS used the Timed Efficient Stream loss-Tolerant
Authentication (TESLA) for broadcast authentication of GBAS
data. In flight trials, the concept and support of TESLA secured
GBAS via LDACS for GAST-D services, supporting category
II/III precision approach capabilities, was demonstrated. In this
work, different ways are investigated to further optimize latency
and security data overhead for an optimized transmission of
TESLA secure GBAS packets via LDACS. Initial evaluation show
how promising the different options are. Further it is shown how
the developed concept for secure GBAS can also be applied to
generalized secure broadcast over LDACS.
Index Terms—LDACS, GBAS, TESLA, cyber security, com-
munication performance
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is used
to improve the accuracy and integrity of Global Navigation
Satellite Systems (GNSSs) to allow GNSS-based precision ap-
proaches and automatic landings landings of aircraft. Several
natural phenomena, such as ionospheric scintillations, iono-
spheric gradient or the troposphere’s influence on GNSS signal
transmission times, make exact positioning with decimeter ac-
curacy in three dimensions difficult. GBAS reference stations
on the ground with precisely known positions can generate cor-
rection data based on their received GNSS position and their
known, exact position. These corrections, together with associ-
ated integrity parameters are broadcast to approaching aircraft.
Based on this data, aircraft can calculate their position with up
to decimeter precision and, even more important, with integrity
bounds on the solution. GBAS enables modern aircraft to per-
form safe and secure GNSS-based landings while offering ad-
vantages over the Instrument Landing System (ILS) commonly
used today [6].
GBAS requires a data link to transmit the GNSS corrections








Fig. 1: Basic functionality of GBAS
link is specific to GBAS: The VHF Data Broadcast (VDB)
[20]. The VDB data link has been identified as potentially
limiting the evolution of GBAS in several ways [8], [9], [19],
[31]. This lead Felux et al. to propose the use of an alternative
data link for GBAS [7]: The L-band Digital Aeronautical
Communication System (LDACS), which is a general purpose
broadband data link for aeronautical communication related to
safety and regularity of flight [27]. Flight trials demonstrated
LDACS’ capability to support GBAS Approach Service Type
(GAST) type C and GAST type D with high accuracy, as
well as the capability of LDACS to authenticate every GBAS
message with the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Au-
thentication (TESLA) broadcast authentication protocol [20].
In the aftermath of these flight trials, Gräupl et al. [11]
showed that latency can be improved significantly by optimiz-
ing the TESLA parameters for GBAS. As stated in [11] further
optimizations (e.g., by lowering the TESLA key disclosure
delay d or the time interval Tint) are imaginable and LDACS is
not limited to GBAS and might serve more broadcast services.
Thus, the following two open questions are investigated in
the current paper: (I) How to further optimize latency and
security overhead for TESLA secured GBAS over LDACS.
And (II) how to generalize these optimizations for usage in a
multitude of broadcast applications. In order to answer these
two questions the objectives of this work are two-folded: (O1)
Optimization of latency times and data overhead sizes for
TESLA secured GBAS via LDACS and (O2) Presentation of
concepts for a broadcast authentication service integrated into
LDACS, enabling low data overhead and low latency broadcast
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Fig. 2: LDACS FL frame structure and interleaving [13]
authentication solutions.
The paper is structured as followed: Section II includes
all required information of LDACS, GBAS, and TESLA to
understand why and how the presented solution was realized
as described in Section III. The realized optimization solution
is evaluated in Sections IV and V from different views. Section
VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the realized optimization solution
presented in Section III basic knowledge about the involved
systems LDACS and GBAS is required. Further, TESLA is
presented here, as it is used here to split time into equal
intervals and apply a certain key to each interval increasing
the security. All this is presented in the following.
A. Characteristics of LDACS
LDACS is a ground-based cellular digital aeronautical com-
munications system for flight guidance and communications
related to the safety and regularity of flight [28]. It has been
developed in Europe, is currently under standardization in the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [16] and has
been tested in experimental flight trials [20]. It is deployed as
a cellular network, where every radio cell has a transmission
site, called a Ground Station (GS), which can serve several
hundred Aircraft Stations (ASs).
LDACS is a full-duplex communication system with two
channels using Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing
(OFDM). The communication channel from ground to aircraft
is called Forward Link (FL), while the opposite channel is
called Reverse Link (RL). As GBAS data is only transmitted
from the ground to the aircraft, only the FL is considered here.
The LDACS specification [13] defines the FL frame struc-
ture of LDACS to be organized into recurring Super Frames
(SFs) of 240 ms length. Each SF starts with a Broadcast (BC)
slot of 6.72 ms length used for control data. It is followed
by four Multi Frames (MFs) of 58.32 ms duration. Each
MF is structured into 27 Physical Layer-Packet Data Units
(PHY-PDUs) á 2.16 ms. Several PHY-PDUs are used for
control data in each MF. The Common Control (CC) slot starts
always in PHY-PDU 13 and its size can change dynamically
according to the current amount of control data from one to
eight PHY-PDUs. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
The PHY-PDUs of one MF are interleaved in a given
pattern for increased interference robustness. All PHY-PDUs
interleaved with each other must be received completely,
before data can be successfully extracted. In each FL MF
the PHY-PDUs 1 to 6, 7 to 12, 13 to 21, and 22 to 27 are
interleaved with each other (cf. Figure 2 [13].
An AS only knows how to interpret data in the FL
PHY-PDUs, when it has received the slot allocations in the
CC slot. There, the allocations of data within the next MF
are announced and only with those an AS knows which data
from the GS is intended for it. The LDACS GS can constantly
add data to the continuous FL data stream. However, the
AS can only interpret received data as addressed to it after
the entire reception of the CC slot. Also it has to wait for
all interleaved PHY-PDUs to be successfully received, which
happens in intervals of six (6 × 2.16 ms= 12.96 ms) or nine
PHY-PDUs (9×2.16 ms= 19.44 ms) as indicated in Figure 2.
The LDACS specification defines different Coding and
Modulation Scheme (CMS) schemes for user data, based
on the current channel quality and resulting Bit Error Rate
(BER). FL PHY-PDUs sizes range from 728, 960, 1080,
1456, 1936, 2176, 2928 to 3296 b, starting at 728 b with
the Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying (QPSK) modulation and a
convolutional coding rate of 1/2 and ending at 3296 with the
64-Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (64-QAM) modulation
and a convolutional coding rate of 3/4 [13]. CC control data
of LDACS remains at the lowest CMS scheme for maximum
robustness. As mentioned above, 1 to 8 CC slots per LDACS
MF are allocated, depending on the amount of AS in an
LDACS cell or the current resource allocation scheduling
demand by the AS. This allows for 728 to 5.824 b of CC
data. Also, depending on the amount of CC slots allocated,
the amount of data PHY-PDUs in the MF part three varies
from 1 to 8 data PHY-PDUs.
B. Characteristics of GBAS
As explained in section I, GBAS ground stations use the
VDB data link to broadcast differential corrections, integrity
parameters, and approach path data to arriving aircraft (see
Figure 1). Currently, only standards for single-frequency and
single-constellation GBAS are available [15]. In this type
of architecture, the transmission of Single Frequency and
Single Constellation (SFSC) differential corrections for all
satellites in view is ensured and the VDB capacity is typically
not a problem. However, in addition to the transmission of
all the required data, a sufficient VDB coverage must also
be provided. This can be especially challenging in complex
airports (e.g. Frankfurt), where the use of multiple VDB
transmitters could be required in order to fulfil the VDB
field strength requirements in the whole GBAS coverage area.
In this case, the VDB transmitters operate in different time
slots on the same channel. In such a setup, the main limiting
factor is to find suitable locations for these additional VDB
transmitters within the area of an airport, since GAST-D
has other siting constrains associated which could make this
task especially difficult. Also the data throughput is reduced
inversely proportional to the number of VDB transmitters.
With the evolution of GBAS from a single-frequency single-
constellation to a dual-frequency multi-constellation architec-
ture the provision of the required data is a major concern.
Different possibilities for future Dual Frequency and Multi-
Constellation (DFMC) GBAS architectures are under discus-
sion, each of which has a different impact in terms of required
data link capacity. Within the framework of the European
project SESAR2020 [29], a first architecture for DFMC called
GAST-F has been proposed and a possible associated VDB
structure was firstly introduced in [31]. Alternatively, a new
concept for DFMC GBAS, which consist of transmitting the
raw measurements and shifting most of the processing to the
aircraft, has been recently proposed as part of the effort to
standardize DFMC GBAS. This alternate concept has less
reliance on legacy service processing, which could allow more
flexible expansions of GBAS as, e.g., especially the use of a
new data link as proposed in this paper.
For the analysis of potential latency improvements, the
actual packet formats and packet sizes of current GBAS
messages via VDB are essential to be understood. Radio
Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) DO-253D
[24] and DO-246D [25]- Minimum Operational Performance
Standards (MOPS) for list packet formats do not yet apply to
dual frequency, multi-constellation GBAS. For future GBAS
operations Stanisak et al. [31] proposed a possible DFMC
VDB message scheme, that is summarized in Table I. In this
scheme a total of 859 B is required to provide all required
information to the airborne users with appropriate update rates.
From Table I it can be seen that the packet size heavily
depends on the amount of observable satellites at any given
TABLE I: GBAS Message Type (MT), for number of satellites
N and maximum size of message [31]









MT11 (N=10) 84 B
time. Due to the slot structure of VDB, a message is limited
to 222 B which allows single frequency corrections for a
maximum of 18 satellites per VDB slot. Still, consecutive
0.5 s VDB frames can contain different satellites as long as
the corrections fulfill the requirements in terms of applicability
age. In [31] for example, corrections for a second frequency
are provided for only 9 satellites per frame.
In the LDACS flight campaign, the use of up to 29 satellites
for L1 100 s and 13 satellites for L5 100 s GBAS processing
was demonstrated, [20] while providing all corrections at the
full 2 Hz update rate. To transmit this amount of data, a
dynamic number of 1000 B GBAS packets every half second
was applied and, thus, fully utilizing the significantly higher
data rate of LDACS. Instead of following the VDB format
in Table I, a custom data stream was used as the focus of
the demonstration was on the general feasibility of latencies.
While the final structure of messages in future DFMC GBAS
is still under investigation, e.g. in SESAR2020, payloads of
maximum 888 B are likely to be expected in the future due
to the implications of the VDB slot structure. Without loss of
generality, for this work, further investigations were performed
with packets of 859 B size.
C. Characteristics of TESLA
The basic idea of TESLA is to split time into equal
intervals and apply a certain key from a cryptographically-
linked key chain to each interval. The sender calculates a
Message Authentication Code (MAC) for every message using
the key of the current interval and applies that MAC, as well
as a key from the key chain but from a prior interval, to each
message. The key required to verify the current MAC is thus
released later in time, making the sender of the message the
only one in possession of the most recent key. Only with
a certain delay, the recipient receives the required key and
can verify the integrity of the attached MAC to a message.
Hence, combining symmetric cryptographic measure, MACs
and key chains, with a delay in the release of the key creates
a signature-like scheme [23].
For TESLA to work properly, sender and receiver must
be loosely time-synchronized and TESLA parameters such
as interval duration Tint or key disclosure delay d must be
distributed in an authentic manner. For the purpose of this
work, especially the two aforementioned parameters Tint and
d are important for latency optimizations. For optimizations
of the security data overhead, different MAC generating
functions, such as Cipher-based MAC (CMAC), Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication Code (HMAC), KECCAK Message
Authentication Code (KMAC) or blake2b/blake2s, as well as
different key sizes are of interest.
III. METHOD FOR OPTIMIZING LATENCY OF TESLA
SECURED GBAS VIA LDACS
Here, different options for latency and security data over-
head optimizations are introduced.
A. Dimensions for Optimizations
Based on results in [11], [20], the following dimensions for
optimization were identified:
• Data Rate: Overall LDACS provides up to 1428 kbps
in the FL, while VDB provides a maximum of 31.5
kbps [25]. One dimension, in which optimize can be
performed is the data rate required to transmit TESLA
secured GBAS data via LDACS.
• Timing in LDACS MF: Another important detail is
the analysis of the LDACS FL design and message
prioritization method, allowing for a fixed and optimized
transmission of TESLA secured GBAS data.
• Choice of TESLA parameters Tint, d: As identified in
[11], [20], the main TESLA parameters to optimize are
the time interval Tint and the key disclosure delay d.
• Alignment of LDACS frames and TESLA intervals:
As TESLA requires a loose time synchronization between
sender and receiver, the TESLA timing must be aligned
with LDACS. In the best case, a key disclosure interval
elapses between GBAS messages transmitted via LDACS.
As the data rate of LDACS is sufficient to try out different
TESLA approaches, the focus lies on two things:
1) On the optimizing the choice of TESLA parameters Tint,
d in the context of the LDACS MF and alignment and
2) On the way TESLA and GBAS is integrated into
LDACS.
B. Optimizing Key Update Rates of TESLA
The work of Gräupl et al. [11] demonstrated the possibility
of improving the latency of TESLA secured GBAS via LDACS
relative to the Migration towards Integrated COM/NAV Avion-
ics (MICONAV) flight trials by up to a factor of four. As a
result it was concluded that the biggest problem in improving
TESLA verification latencies, is the update rate in which
GBAS data is sent. In [11], [20], the TESLA key required for
verification was attached to each GBAS message, hence the
overall TESLA secured GBAS via LDACS latency resulted in
the GBAS update rate plus the LDACS transmission latency,
assuming that the TESLA key, required for verification, is
always sent in the next GBAS update. RTCA DO-253D
[24] defines an update rate of 2Hz, hence the best possible
cumulative LDACS and TESLA latency is 500 ms plus the
LDACS latency [11]. This resulted in a 95-percentile latency
of 632.98 ms [11]. However, the shortest key update rate would
be transmitting a GBAS message and immediately sending the
key update in the following message.
Hash-functions, key sizes and security data overhead:
During MICONAV, the python3’s nacl [2] crypto-libary
with the blake2b hash function [26] for MAC key derivation
and MAC generation was used. This resulted in a 144 B
cryptographic overhead, consisting of 64 B key, 64 B MAC tag
and 16 B salt value [20], producing a pre-image-security level
of 481 b and a collision-security level of 224 b [14]. Given an
overall [17] message size of 859 B, 144 B additional security
seems excessive. Thus, other possibilities are investigated in
the following:
• blake2s offers a pre-image-security level of 241 b and
a collision-security level of 112 b [14] by introducing a
32 B key, 32 B MAC tag and a 8 B salt value, hence a
72 B security data overhead.
• Other possibilities are taken from standards from the
standardization organ IETF (Internet Engineering Task
force) proposing several MAC algorithms: HMAC [18],
Cipher-based MAC (CMAC) [30], and KECCAK Mes-
sage Authentication Code (KMAC) [17].
HMAC has to be used together with a hash-function,
where the NIST (National Insitute of Standards and Technol-
ogy) currently recommends Secure Hash Function (SHA)-1,
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, and
SHA-512/256 [22] or SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and
SHA3-512 [5] for that purpose. Assuming only hash-function
from the SHA-2 and SHA-3 family, this results in using SHA-
256 or SHA3-256 for 128 b collision resistance and 256 b
pre-image resistance. Hence the overhead amounts to a 32 B
key and a 32 B MAC tag [1].
CMAC is a MAC based on approved symmetric key block
ciphers, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[4]. For the purpose of this work, AES was assumed as the
underlying block cipher with key-lengths of 128 b, 192 b and
256 b. Hence for a 128 b security level, the cryptographic
overhead of AES-128-CMAC is 16 B key and a 16 B MAC
tag.
Finally KMAC is a Pseudo Random Function (PRF) and
keyed hash function based on KECCAK, which provides
variable-length output [17]. It has two variants KMAC128
and KMAC256, which use cSHAKE128 and cSHAKE256
respectively. As the KMAC key length directly influences the
security of the scheme, and an attacker can find a key K with
2len(K) operations, given a small number of MAC, plaintext
pairs, the key must not be shorter than 128 b. In terms of
output, KMAC128 security is roughly equivalent to the AES-
CMAC scheme, if a 128 b output length of KMAC128 is
chosen [17]. With a 256 b input key and a 256 b output
tag length, KMAC256 equals the security of HMAC-SHA-
256 [17].
Summarizing this all up, means that if a 256 b security level
(i.e., based on 256 b preimage resistance) is required, either
blake2s with 72 B security overhead, HMAC-SHA-256/HMAC-
SHA3-256 with 64 B security overhead of KMAC256 with
64 B security overhead are possible candidates. If a 128 b
security level (i.e., based on 128 b pre-image resistance) is
required, either blake2s with 16 B key and thus 40 B security
overhead, AES-128-CMAC with 32 B security overhead, or
KMAC with 16 B key and output and, thus, 32 B security
overhead are an option.
Therefore, for the proposed optimization in this paper the
lowest 32 B security overhead is proposed, hence either AES-
128-CMAC or KMAC with 16 B key. With that, a TESLA
secured GBAS message is 859 B +16 B +16 B = 891 B
long.
Integration of secure GBAS into LDACS framing:
The general idea of reducing latency of TESLA secured
GBAS is to send the TESLA key update as soon as possible
after the actual GBAS data. For that purpose, 128 b dummy
data is generated, a MAC on it calculated and that dummy
data, the key update and the MAC sent after the TESLA
secured GBAS message.
Following LDACS CMS scheme presented in Section II-A
and data sizes per FL Data Channel (DCH) data PHY-PDU,
and assuming best CMS, the 891 B TESLA secured GBAS
message fits into three FL PHY-PDUs (i.e., d 71283296e = 3). After
that, in the next PHY-PDU the key update is transmitted with
its 48 B or 384 b size.
With channel quality getting worse, at CMS=3, one inter-
leaved MF part is not sufficient anymore for one TESLA
secured GBAS plus the TESLA key update message (i.e.,
d 71281080e = 7 > 6) and the message needs to be split up
into two MF parts. In this case, the first seven PHY-PDUs
carry the TESLA secured GBAS and the eighth PHY-PDU the
TESLA key update message. Even at worst channel quality at
CMS=1 (i.e., FL PHY-PDU block size of 728 b), still two
interleaved blocks of six FL PHY-PDU each are sufficient, as
d 7128728 e = 11 < 12. Here 11 PHY-PDUs carry the TESLA
secured GBAS and the twelfth PHY-PDUs the TESLA key
update message. With that, the optimum latency for TESLA
secured GBAS via LDACS is the length of one interleaved
MF part, 4LFL−MF−part, for CMS ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, or two
interleaved MF parts for CMS ∈ {1, 2, 3}, a delta for the
transmission delay, 4t, and a delta for the processing delay
on receiver end, 4p.
TESLA parameter choices:
Overall, this idea, sending TESLA secured GBAS data first
and then immediately follow up with a key update, requires
very exact scheduling on GS side. I.e. GBAS data and key
updates must be prioritized high, i.e., via sending GBAS
messages with a high LDACS Classes of Service (CoS), the
TESLA parameter disclosure delay d must be one and the
interval duration must be fairly short.
As the TESLA key schedule must align with the LDACS
frame design, Tint was initially set to 6 ms. Now it had to
be ensured that sending the TESLA secured GBAS part in
the first PHY-PDUs and then the TESLA key update in the
next PHY-PDU always has a TESLA key update in between
those two messages. Further, this had to be checked for every
CMS and with every starting position of the TESLA secured
GBAS message within the SF of LDACS. If the TESLA
secured GBAS message uses the key relevant at the beginning
of sending the message for calculating the MAC, then that
scheme works. For instance at CMS = 8 or CMS = 7,
sending the GBAS message at the beginning of the first MF
with Tint = 6 ms sets the key at k1 for calculating the relevant
MAC, while the key update in the later PHY-PDU contains
the key k2. For CMS ∈ {4, 5, 6}, the key in the key update
message is k3 and for CMS=3 or 2, the key in the key update
message is k4, and finally for CMS=1, the key in the key
update message is k5.
As the key update rate is very small with this scheme,
AS and GS have to be synchronized well. As the proposed
AES-128-CMAC calculations on a Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA) have a throughput of 3.80 Gbps with a clock
frequency of 302.84 MHz [3], the processing effort would be
manageable, making this concept feasible.
C. Realistic Data Transmission Latencies, obtained in MI-
CONAV Flight Trials
The previous analysis only looked at the theoretical possible
latencies based on the LDACS frame structure. Here, actual
latencies of LDACS FL data, observed in the MICONAV
flight trials [20], are analysed. During MICONAV CMS=1
(i.e., FL PHY-PDU block size of 728 b) was used in the
flight trials. With GBAS being a broadcast service, only the
Unacknowledged (UNACK) data transmission of LDACS is
analysed here.
Looking at the MICONAV actual flight data [20], out of
25867 successfully transmitted UNACK packets, 560 of them
were transmitted with a latency below 30 ms, ranging from
23.02 ms to 24.53 ms, with a 95-percentile of 24.34 ms.
Further, 3152 packets were successfully transmitted and re-
ceived between 43.54 ms to 46.56 ms, with a 95-percentile of
44.49 ms. Finally, 22103 packets were successfully transmitted
and received between 54.11 ms to 67.86 ms, with a 95-
percentile of 61.21 ms. Everything is depicted in Fig. 2.
In Section II-A the interleaving and FL resource allocation
pattern was discussed and as Fig. 3 shows, the shortest latency
to be 23.02 ms, which means, that for these shortest-latency-
packets the third slot of a MF, the one which carries CC data
and user plane data, was used. Hence, the AS receives the FL
resource allocation, carried by the CC slot, and is then able
to process the following GBAS packet right away.
IV. RESULTS FOR LDACS DCH USE FOR SECURE GBAS
In this section, different ways to minimize the latency for
TESLA secured GBAS data are investigated. The basic idea is
sending TESLA secured data first, immediately followed by a
message carrying the required TESLA key of the next interval
(Cf. Section III-B).
First, a theoretical optimal latency is presented, followed
by a best case scenario, before demonstrating a realistic sce-
nario, based on actual measurement data from the MICONAV
flight campaign. Please note, all results assume deterministic
scheduling on GS end, such that the TESLA key disclosure
for the TESLA secured GBAS data happens within the same





















Fig. 3: Relative frequency distribution of LDACS latency
in unacknowledged transmission mode obtained during the
MICONAV flight trials.
interleaved LDACS MF part, resulting in TESLA and LDACS
latency being equally long. Please also note, that the verifica-
tion time of the MAC is assumed as zero and a TESLA secured
GBAS packet is considered received and verified, once it and
the key, disclosed in the next TESLA interval, has reached the
AS.
A. Calculation of Optimal Authentication Latency
In Section II-A, the interleaving pattern of LDACS in the
FL is discussed. It can be concluded that the shortest interval
in which TESLA secured GBAS data can be transmitted,
received and verified, are the interleaved PHY-PDU parts,
4LFL−MF−part, plus a delta for the transmission delay, 4t,
and a delta for the processing delay on receiver end, 4p. In
this subsection, for the sake of discussion, 4p and 4t are
assumed to be 0.
TESLA parameters can be optimized with d = 1 and
Tint = 6 ms. Hence, within one interleaved MF part, and
LDACS CMS = 8, one TESLA secured GBAS message
was transmitted in the first three PHY-PDUs, with the fourth
PHY-PDU always landing in the next TESLA interval, dis-
closing the necessary key to verify the GBAS message in
PHY-PDU one, two, and three. With all these assumptions,
a theoretical optimum transmission and authentication latency
for TESLA secured GBAS data via LDACS at CMS = 8 is
ranging from 12.96 ms - 19.68 ms, depending on the amount
of interleaved PHY-PDUs per MF part, with the mean latency
being 15 ms and the 95-percentile being 19.50 ms.
B. Estimation of Optimal Authentication Latency in our Im-
plementation
In Section III-C, measurements obtained during the
MICONAV flight campaign were discussed. As it could be
seen, for Unacknowledged (UNACK) LDACS, hence broad-
cast transmission, there are very short transmission and pro-
cessing times possible with LDACS, ranging from 23.02 ms to
24.53 ms. For this best case scenario with possible processing





















Fig. 4: Relative frequency distribution of LDACS latency in
UNACK for 60B to 360B sized packets with high priority.
Obtained during the MICONAV flight trials [21].
and transmission times, latency for TESLA secured GBAS
data via LDACS is ranging from 23.02 ms to 24.53 ms with
the mean being 24 ms and the 95-percentile being 24.34 ms.
C. Estimation of Typical Authentication Latency in our Imple-
mentation
If a realistic latency for transmission and authentication
times for TESLA secured GBAS via LDACS should be
obtained, a statistical model of the latency measurements
obtained during MICONAV and sort by priority and packet
size is required to be build. As GBAS will be a high priority
service, need to be found that resembling the size of actual
TESLA secured GBAS packets, sized 891 B, plus the neces-
sary TESLA key disclosure packet of 48 B size. Thus, packets
of 939 B size are of interest.
In Section III-C, it was mentioned that the most robust
CMS of LDACS being used during the MICONAV flight
campaign. For the preservation of comparability, the GBAS
packet size of 939 B need to be divided by a factor of
4.5274527 as 3296728 = 4.5274527. Keep in mind that the
largest LDACS PHY-PDU size is 3296 b at CMS = 8 and
the smallest is 728 b at CMS = 1. Hence for this demon-
stration of realistic transmission and authentication latencies,
packets sized 939
4.5274527
' 208 B or 1660 b were of high
interest. Unfortunately, no actual packet with that size has
been transmitted during MICONAV. In order to receive a good
approximation, packets with high LDACS CoS are considered
(i.e., high LDACS priority, and range between 60 B to 360 B in
size). 54 of 25867 packets were found, matching that selection.
Their latency distribution is illustrated in Figure 4.
Hence, a realistic, optimized transmission and authentica-
tion latency for TESLA secured GBAS data via LDACS ranges
from 23.90 ms to 55.56 ms, with the mean being at 40.59 ms
and the 95-percentile at 55.45 ms.
D. Findings
Latency times of just the interleaved LDACS MF part of
12.96 ms to 19.68 ms are obviously not realistic, most of all,
as 4p and 4t were deliberately set to 0, but times ranging
from 23.02 ms to 55.56 ms, including transmission 4t and
packet processing time 4p, are. With that, optimized LDACS
user-data channel based TESLA secured GBAS latency in the
95-percentile of 55.45 ms is possible. However, this strongly
depends on several parameters, such as the traffic load in an
LDACS cell, the prioritization of GBAS packets, the schedul-
ing at GS, very accurate time synchronization between AS and
GS and the overall implementation of interleaved MF packet
processing and further data redirection to higher LDACS
protocol levels. But this shows, that a further improvement
from the 95-percentile of 632.98 ms in [11] by a factor of
11.4 to 55.45 ms is still possible, reducing the overall GBAS
transmission and verification times drastically. However, this
scheme comes with the drawback, that every time a TESLA
secured GBAS packet is sent and immediate key disclosure
requested, an additional 48 B, consisting of 16 B dummy data,
16 B key and 16 B MAC, have to be put in the DCH as
broadcast message, increasing overall security data overhead.
Also the TESLA parameters d = 1 and Tint = 6 ms to enable
this low latency, especially the very small Tint, can become
very expensive in computational overhead.
These drawbacks, originating mainly from the use of the
LDACS DCH for TESLA key updates, point to an investiga-
tion of using LDACS control channels for that purpose.
V. RESULTS FOR AN LDACS CONTROL CHANNEL BASED
BROADCAST AUTHENTICATION SERVICE
In Figure 2, the frame structure of LDACS is depicted.
The LDACS FL has two control channels, the Broadcast
Control Channel (BCCH) at the beginning of each SF and
the Common Control Channel (CCCH) during each MF. Both
are investigated for suitability carrying a TESLA key update
and thus enabling a control channel based data broadcast
authentication service for LDACS.
A. Secure Broadcast in the Broadcast Control Channel
The BCCH of LDACS occurs every 240ms and consists
of three slots. BC slot 1 and 3 have 528 b space and are
1.74ms long each, BC slot 2 1000 b and 3.24ms duration.
The LDACS specification defines BC slots 1 and 3 to contain
information about adjacent cells and BC slot 2 information
about the current cell.
The only mandatory message each SF in BC slot 1,3 is
the Adjacent Cell Broadcast (ACB) of 50-662 b size). Other
optional messages in these slots are Scanning Table Broadcast
(STB) sized between 38 b and 446 b), GS Position Broadcast
sized 90-1178 b and GS Service Capability Broadcast sized
28-266 b. In BC slot 2 only the System Identification Broad-
cast (SIB) message with size 66 b is mandatory. Optionally
the Voice Service Broadcast (VSB) sized 77-938 b can be
transmitted here. The total size of BC slots is 2056 b and the
sum of total mandatory message bits per SF is 728 b.
Offering enough space the TESLA key update is placed in BC
slot 2, with the SIB being the message, on which the MAC is
built upon. This way, the TESLA secured GBAS message can
be sent in any DCH in any of the four MF per SF and then
verified with the next broadcast beacon from the GS.
The TESLA parameters of this approach are d = 1 and
Tint = 240 ms, with the beginning of the TESLA interval
synchronized again at the very beginning of the LDACS SF.
The packet structure is SIB0, HKi(SIB0), K(i−1).
Assuming a uniformly distributed probability of the GS
sending a TESLA secured GBAS message in any DCH
interleaved MF part, the latency can be calculated. From
Section III-C, the possible transmission and processing time
of 3.58 ms was taken. The minimum TESLA secured GBAS
via LDACS latency for this broadcast authentication service
in the BCCH is 12.96 ms+1.74 ms+3.58 ms = 18.28 ms.
This occurs, when the GBAS message is transmitted in the
last MF part of the last MF in the SF. The maximum latency
for this method is 12 × 12.96 ms +4 × 19.44 ms +1.74 ms
+3.58 ms = 238.60 ms, which happens if the GBAS message
is transmitted in the very first interleaved MF part of the first
MF. The mean latency of this method is 128.44 ms and 95-
percentile latency 228.88 ms.
As for the data overhead, this method appends a TESLA
key and a MAC of the SIB. Hence the overhead is 256 b per
SF.
B. Secure Broadcast in the Common Control Channel
As depicted in Figure 2, the CCCH appears in every MF and
can vary in length between 1 and 8 PHY-PDUs. First it needs
to be investigated, whether there is enough space available in
CC slots or if the effectiveness of LDACS would be reduced
by placing TESLA data here.
The load on the CC heavily depends on (1) the number of
aircraft in an LDACS cell, (2) the current data load in the cell
depending on the chosen CMS and the (3) used traffic pattern.
High loads on LDACS with CMS = 1 and CMS = 8 with
the FACTS2 (Framework for Aeronautical Communications
and Traffic Simulations 2) were simulated [12]:
The number of AS was modeled with #AS ∈ {1, 50, 100,
150, 200, 250, 300, 350, 400, 450, 500, 512}, the throughput
with CMS = 1 FL: 728 b per frame) ∈ {1, 50, 100, 150,
200, 250, 300, 350}, with the maximum LDACS capacity
being 315.5 kbps FL and 294.9 kbps RL at CMS = 1.
For CMS = 8 FL: 3296 b per frame, RL: 528 b per
tile) ∈ {1, 100, 200, 400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600},
12 values were investigated as parameters, with the maximum
LDACS capacity being 1428.3 kbps FL and 1390 kbps RL at
CMS = 8. The used FL traffic pattern consists of 74% small
125 B packets and 26% large 1400 B packets. The RL traffic
pattern was modeled with 80% small 125 B packets and 20%
large 1400 B packets. It was investigated in [10] this traffic
pattern to reflect realistic load for LDACS.
All scenarios were simulated for 1000 s, resulting in a total
simulation time at CMS = 1 of 96.000 s and CMS = 8 of








(b) CC allocation at LDACS CMS=8
Fig. 5: CC allocation capacity utilization for the 99-percentile case in percentage, depending on number of AS and data load
in kbps at lowest and highest LDACS CMS
for CMS = 1 and in Figure 5b for CMS = 8 and show
the percentage of CC allocation over all eight possible CC
PHY-PDUs.
With a maximum CC size of 8×728 b = 5.824 b, Figure 5a
and 5b clearly show, that the CC is never at capacity limit in
the 99-percentile. During all simulations, only in four cases
total, more than 7 PHY-PDUs were required to transmit control
data. This analysis clearly demonstrates the feasibility to add
TESLA verification data within the LDACS CC slot, without
reducing LDACS functionality.
The TESLA parameters of this approach are d = 1 and
Tint = 60 ms, with the beginning of the TESLA interval
synchronized 30 ms before or after the very beginning of the
LDACS SF, so just before the beginning of the next CC part.
The packet structure is CCdata0 , HKi(CCdata0), K(i−1).
Now the latency and data overhead for this method can be
calculated: From Section III-C, the possible transmission and
processing time of 3.58 ms can be assumed. The minimum
TESLA secured GBAS via LDACS latency for this broadcast
authentication service in the CCCH is 12.96 ms+19.44 ms+
3.58 ms = 35.98 ms. This occurs, when the GBAS message
is transmitted in the second MF part, just before the CC part.
The maximum latency for this method is 3 × 12.96 ms +
19.44 ms+ 6.72 ms+ 3.58 ms = 68.62 ms, which happens
if the GBAS message is transmitted in the very last interleaved
MF part of the last MF in a SF. With the possibility of the
GS transmitting a GBAS message equally distributed over the
LDACS SF, the mean latency of this method is 52.36 ms and
the 95-percentile latency 67.16 ms.
As for the data overhead, this method appends a MAC of
the CC data and a TESLA key, hence the overhead is 256 b
per 60 ms.
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
During the course of this paper, the TESLA secured GBAS
via LDACS latency and presented three possible ways of
implementing them within LDACS was optimized. In Table
II, the different approaches with their individual advantages
and disadvantages are compared.
Table II reveals, that placing the TESLA relevant infor-
mation within the DCH of LDACS, attached to a GBAS
message, has the disadvantage, that only this specific message
is protected. Or in other words: The latency and data overhead
was optimized for that service, e.g., GBAS explicitly and other
services within the DCH need to apply their own broadcast
protection for timely updates of TESLA keys.
On the other hand, the control plane approaches, in column
four and five in Table II, have the advantage, that the TESLA
key update happens regularly, regardless of the underlying
service that needs the key update. This allows any service
that requires broadcast authentication to apply a MAC and a
key to its message, and the key update happens either in the
BC or CC slot. That way, more than just the GBAS service
can benefit from the security of broadcast authentication. This
clearly fulfils objective (O2) enabling low data overhead and
low latency broadcast authentication solutions for LDACS.
Finally, a look on the different security data overheads, the
different three methods presented in this paper generate, was
done.
Figure 6 presents this, with BCCH approach requiring
1067 b/s, CCCH 4067 b/s and the DCH approach varying
based on number of services and update rates. The ”x”s
in Figure 6 show where the DCH approach matches the
security overhead of BCCH and CCCH. For example, the
DCH approach with one service matches the BCCH one at
240ms update rate and the CCCH based one at 60ms. This is
expected, as Tint for TESLA anchored in BCCH and CCCH
was chosen exactly at those values.
During this work, further optimizations of latency and secu-
rity data overhead for TESLA secured GBAS via LDACS were
investigated. Different ways for optimizations were presented,
such as the concept of sending an immediate TESLA key
TABLE II: Comparison of TESLA integration approaches within LDACS
Source Broadcast Authentication Strategy Mean Latency P95 Latency Security Data Overhead TESLA parameters
for securing n services
[20] TESLA message part attached to GBAS data in DCH 1219.52 ms 1287.96 ms n× 144 B d = 1, Tint = 1s
[11] TESLA message part attached to GBAS data in DCH 617.94 ms 632.98 ms n× 32 B d = 1, Tint = 300 ms
Section IV TESLA message part attached to extra message in DCH 40.59 ms 55.45 ms n× 48 B d = 1, Tint = 6 ms
Section V-A TESLA message part attached to message in BCCH 128.44 ms 228.88 ms 1× 32 B d = 1, Tint = 240 ms
Section V-B TESLA message part attached to message in CCCH 52.36 ms 67.16 ms 1× 32 B d = 1, Tint = 60 ms
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Fig. 6: TESLA induced security data overhead for the three approaches discussed above. Embedding TESLA into one of the
two LDACS FL control channels (BCCH, DCCH) is beneficial for high update rates and high numbers of services. For a small
number of services or low update rates it is more efficient (area below the BCCH or CCCH line in the graph) for each service
to run it’s own TESLA instance.
update after a GBAS message in the LDACS DCH and set
TESLA parameters to d = 1 and a very short Tint = 6 ms.
With actual transmission times and latencies obtained during
an LDACS flight campaign, an estimation for the processing
δp and transmission delay δt was found at 3.58 ms. First
optimizations for the DCH based scheme were shown with the-
oretical values at 19.50 ms, then best-case values of 24.34 ms
and finally realistic values of 55.45 ms, all for the P95% case.
A possibility for TESLA key update within the BCCH and
CCCH control channel of LDACS was reached. Both ways
are feasible and this enables LDACS to protect an arbitrary
amount of broadcast authentication requiring services via the
timely key update in either BCCH or CCCH with security
data overheads of 1067 b/s, respectively 4067 b/s. By doing
so, latencies are optimized to 228.88 ms for the BCCH and
67.16 ms in the CCCH case, both for P95%. All three variations
are a latency and data overhead improvement of the work done
in [11] and clearly fulfil objective (O1), optimization of latency
times and data overhead sizes for TESLA secured GBAS via
LDACS.
To conclude, placing TESLA key updates either in the
LDACS BCCH or CCCH channel is highly recommended
and depends on the requirements of the target application:
if update rates of 240ms are acceptable, as is the case with
GBAS, then the BCCH approach is recommended. Otherwise
it is recommend the CCCH approach for even shorter update
rates.
This work shows LDACS’s capability to secure an arbitrary
amount of broadcast services with very little security overhead
and demonstrates a further reduction of TESLA related laten-
cies in LDACS. With a twenty-fold improvement in latency
and a 4.5-fold improvement in security overhead, this marks
an important step towards the integration of TESLA secured
GBAS into LDACS.
APPENDIX
64-QAM 64-Quadrature Amplitude Modulation
AS Aircraft Station
BC Broadcast
BCCH Broadcast Control Channel
BER Bit Error Rate
CC Common Control
CCCH Common Control Channel
CMAC Cipher-based MAC
CMS Coding and Modulation Scheme
CoS Classes of Service
DCH Data Channel
DFMC Dual Frequency and Multi-Constellation
FL Forward Link
GAST GBAS Approach Service Type
GBAS Ground Based Augmentation System
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GS Ground Station
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
KMAC KECCAK Message Authentication Code
LDACS L-band Digital Aeronautical Communication
System
MAC Message Authentication Code
MF Multi Frame
MICONAV Migration towards Integrated COM/NAV
Avionics
MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Standards
MT Message Type
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing
PHY-PDU Physical Layer-Packet Data Unit
QPSK Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying
RL Reverse Link
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
SF Super Frame
SFSC Single Frequency and Single Constellation
TESLA Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant
Authentication
UNACK Unacknowledged
VDB VHF Data Broadcast
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[20] N. Mäurer, T. Gräupl, M. Bellido-Manganell, D. Mielke, A. Filip-
Dhaubhadel, O. Heirich, D. Gerbeth, M. Felux, L. Schalk, D. Becker,
N. Schneckenburger, and M. Schnell, “Flight Trial Demonstration Of
Secure GBAS Via The L-band Digital Aeronautical Communication-
System (LDACS),” IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine,
vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 8–17, 2021.
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